collision with it under circumstances which warranted a finding that the son was negligent. In determining the question of the father's liability for the injuries, the court in Smith *v.* Jordan, 97 Northeastern Reporter, 761, holds that the relation of husband and wife was such that the wife's use of the machine at the time was not her business, but the business of the husband, and the son in operating the machine at the mother's request was doing so in furtherance of the father's business, and he was therefore liable for the son's negligence.

NOTE.—In Lynde *v.* Browning, 2 Tenn. App. Cas. 262, it was held that a parent who buys an automobile for family use and allows his sons to operate it for pleasure and convenience of the family is liable for injuries inflicted by a son who is at the time running the machine for the convenience of his brother and himself with the knowledge and consent, expressed or implied, of his father. The court, in the above case, was of the opinion that when the head of a family at the request of the members purchases an automobile to be used indiscriminately for social calls and business errands and pleasure trips, in their career of development and enjoyment, he should be held liable for damages occasioned by collision in every instance except those in which the machine is being operated contrary to his wishes and express directions.

In Daily *v.* Maxwell (Mo.), 133 S. W. 351, it was held that the use of a machine by the minor son for family purposes would create the relation of master and servant.

In Ingraham *v.* Stockman, 118 N. Y. S. 399, which is one of the best considered decisions dealing with responsibility of the owners of automobiles, the following instruction was held proper: "The owner of an automobile should be responsible for injuries caused by it by the negligence of any one whom he permits to run it in the public street." It was further stated that the owner should, in a great measure, be held responsible for the manner in which the machine is being used by any one with his consent.

Liability of Corporation for Negligence of Its Chauffeur.—In Cumberland Tel., etc., Co. *v.* Burns, 1 Tenn. App. Cas. § 148, it was held that the operator of an automobile belonging to a corporation while being used in the business of the corporation and in pursuit of the affairs of the concern, is the servant of the corporation to such an extent as that it will be liable for his negligence.

No Double Standard of Credibility of Men and Women.—A part of the opinion of the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma in Litchfield *v.* State, 126 Pacific Reporter, 707, reads as follows: "This court takes judicial notice that men of the highest reputation for truth are often very lax in their ideas and habits with reference to virtue and morality. This is to be deplored, but it is nevertheless true. We must deal with humanity as it is, and not as we think it should be. It would, therefore, be exceedingly unjust to establish a rule which would allow many of the most truthful men of the state to have their veracity called in question by proof of their reputation for morality. If this is true as to men, why should not the same rule apply to women? We are not willing to establish a

double standard in Oklahoma in favor of men and against womanhood. This court will extend to the prodigal daughter every right and every protection which is afforded the prodigal son. It is a false and vicious standard of morals which opens every door and bids welcome to the prodigal son, but closes every door except that of the grave to the prodigal daughter. We believe that, if any differences are made between men and women, they should be in favor of womanhood."

NOTE.—In Sharon *v.* Hill, 26 Fed. 337, 360, Deady, J., held that "as the world goes and is, the sin of incontinence in a man is compatible with the virtue of veracity, while in the case of a woman, common opinion is otherwise," and further declares it to be "a fact founded on common experience that incontinence in a man does not usually imply the moral degradation and insensibility that it does in a woman."

In Matter of Wool, 36 Mich. 299, Campbell, J., was of the opinion that the testimony of a woman against a lawyer with whom she had had illicit relations was "no more open to criticism on this account than (his), who was in the same moral complications, and equally interested in the results."

Commercial Use of College Name.—A candy manufacturer of Kansas City called one of his varieties "Vassar Chocolates," and put them up in packages on whic appeared the name "Vassar," a likeness of a young lady wearing a mortarboard hat, an imitation of the college pennant, a college yell, and an imitation of the college seal, with the words "Vassar Chocolates" and "Always Fresh" substituted for the words "Vassar College" and "Purity and Wisdom." It was claimed in Vassar College *v.* Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Federal Reporter, 982, among other things, that the use of the name and pictures were calculated to create in the public mind the impression that the chocolates were a particular favorite at Vassar College and with the students and alumnæ, and that it tended to provoke discussion and reproach, to produce criticism and ridicule, and to depreciate the college in the eyes of the public, and an injunction was sought. The bill was dismissed, the court saying: "The injurious effects, if any, of the advertisements complained of are speculative in the highest degree. They seem to me to be largely creations of fancy, due to supersensitiveness and apprehension. They are lodged rather in a feeling of distaste on the part of those interested in Vassar College for seeing its name and insignia, inferentially, at least, linked with any commercial pursuit, than in any appreciable injury to its tangible property. I have not felt, and cannot feel, that any one could think less of this eminent institution by reason of the acts of defendants recited in this bill; and I believe it to be beyond the power of this court to take cognizance of the psychological injuries recited."